Tort Liability for Video Game Manufactures: Will Shifting Public Perceptions Lead to a Change in the Law by West, Ben A.
Science and Technology Law Review
Volume 14 | Number 3 Article 10
2011
Tort Liability for Video Game Manufactures: Will
Shifting Public Perceptions Lead to a Change in the
Law
Ben A. West
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/scitech
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Science and
Technology Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ben A. West, Tort Liability for Video Game Manufactures: Will Shifting Public Perceptions Lead to a Change in the Law, 14 SMU Sci. &
Tech. L. Rev. 509 (2011)
https://scholar.smu.edu/scitech/vol14/iss3/10
Tort Liability for Video Game Manufacturers:
Will Shifting Public Perceptions Lead to a
Change in the Law?
Ben A. West*
I. INTRODUCTION
The video game industry has grown from a niche market to one that
boasted revenues of nearly $20 billion in 2009.' For over thirty years, video
game manufacturers have faced controversy over the possible adverse effects
that games may have on the garners who play them. The majority of cases
dealing with this issue have involved the possibility that video games con-
tribute to the development of violent tendencies in adolescents-the highest
profile of those cases being litigation resulting from the tragic shooting at
Columbine High School in Colorado.2 Until recently, courts almost univer-
sally held that game manufacturers were not liable for injuries to-or caused
by-the individuals who play video games. 3 A decision by the Federal Dis-
trict Court of Hawaii in 2010, however, allowed the defendant game manu-
facture, NCsoft, to survive a motion to dismiss in a lawsuit for negligence,
gross negligence, and negligent inflection of emotional distress.4 This Note
will focus on the issue in Smallwood v. NCsoft Corp., as to whether a video
game manufacturer can be held liable for failure to warn users of a game's
potentially addictive nature. 5 Here, the court held that the plaintiff, Craig
Smallwood, had stated a claim and that NCsoft's motion to dismiss should be
denied based on the physical and mental injuries alleged by Smallwood.6 By
allowing this claim to proceed, the court ignored the standard set by numer-
ous other courts throughout the country, and therefore opened itself to a po-
tential flood of future litigation.
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I. Mike Ferro, 2009 Video Game Industry Revenue Breakdown, GAMER.BLORGE,
http://gamer.blorge.com/2010/01/1 6/2009-video-game-industry-revenue-break-
down/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
2. See Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1270 (D. Colo.
2002).
3. See James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002); Am. Amuse-
ment Mach. Assoc. v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001); Sanders v. Ac-
claim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002).
4. Smallwood v. NCsoft Corp., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1237 (D. Haw. 2010).
5. Id. at 1234-35.
6. Id. at 1236.
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A. Factual Background
NCsoft designed and distributed the online game Lineage H, a fantasy
massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG).7 Smallwood
spent over 20,000 hours playing Lineage /I between 2004 and 2009, and
described "great feelings of euphoria and satisfaction from persistent play" of
the game.8 As a result, he alleged psychological dependence and addiction to
Lineage HJ.9 In 2009, NCsoft released a new game, Aion, and began to pro-
mote it to gamers.' 0 Smallwood alleged that at that time, the company began
to lock players out of its older games-such as Lineage 1-in order to in-
crease the number of users of, and profits for, the new game."I In September
2009, Smallwood discovered that NCsoft had terminated his access without
warning, only informing him that the game manufacturer's actions were nec-
essary because of his alleged participation in a scheme to create real-money
transfers involving the game.' 2 Smallwood denied ever having been in-
volved in any scheme and alleges that this excuse was used as part of a
"banning purge" to remove users from the old games and push them to new
games such as Aion.13 Additionally, Smallwood asserted that the game Line-
age II included Game Masters who were supposed to ensure fairness, but
nevertheless failed in this instance to enforce the rules fairly.'4
Smallwood also alleged that he continued to have "a compulsive urge
and need to play Lineage H," and that he was never provided any warning
from NCsoft of the danger of becoming addicted to the game.' 5 As a result
of the NCsoft's alleged actions, Smallwood claimed he has suffered extreme
emotional distress, including depression.16 Additionally, he was unable to
function independently, was hospitalized for three weeks, and now requires
therapy treatment three times a week.17 Smallwood alleged that if he had
been aware of the unfairness of the game's administration and that he would
become addicted to it, he never would have purchased or played Lineage H.18
7. Id. at 1217-18.
8. Id. at 1218.





14. Smallwood, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 1218.
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B. Description of the Plaintiff's Claim
Smallwood filed the claim in the Federal District Court of Hawaii. It
was brought under diversity jurisdiction because Smallwood was a Hawaiian
resident, and NCsoft had a subsidiary headquartered in Texas.' 9 Smallwood
asserted multiple claims, namely: (1) misrepresentation/deceit, (2) unfair and
deceptive trade practices, (3) defamation/libel/slander, (4) negligence, (5)
gross negligence, (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (7) negligent
inflection of emotional distress, and (8) punitive damages. 20 In claims (1)
and (2), Smallwood argued that NCsoft did not run the game fairly.21 Claim
(3) involved allegations by the plaintiff that the defendant made false and
defamatory statements about him that were published to other ganers. 22
Smallwood's claims (4), (5), (6), and (7) are all related to the defendant's
alleged knowledge of the game's addictive nature and subsequent failure to
warn the plaintiff of this addictive quality.2 3 Finally, claim (8) was for puni-
tive damages related to NCsoft's actions.24
C. Procedural and Substantive History
When Smallwood filed his original complaint, the court dismissed it sua
sponte for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because Smallwood failed to
establish diversity of citizenship.25 The court did grant leave to amend, and
Smallwood subsequently filed an Amended Complaint.26 But upon NCsoft's
motion to dismiss, the court dismissed the Amended Complaint without
prejudice and with leave to amend.27 Smallwood then filed his Second
Amended Complaint, which formed the basis of the court's opinion.28 The
court showed a great deal of leniency towards Smallwood's filings because
he appeared pro se, thus requiring the court to provide special consideration
to his filing.29 But NCsoft argued that an attorney had actually ghost-written
the pleadings and, therefore, not only should this special treatment should not
be observed, but Smallwood's pleadings should also be struck.30 The court
19. Smallwood, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 1217.
20. Id. at 1219.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1234-1236.
24. Smallwood, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 1219.




29. Smallwood, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 1221.
30. Id. at 1222.
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decided that striking the pleadings was too harsh of a penalty, but decided
not to provide any special consideration for the plaintiff's pleadings. 3' Addi-
tionally, the court performed a choice-of-laws analysis to determine whether
it should follow the law of Hawaii or Texas.32 The court found that, under
Hawaii law, a choice of law provision in a contract should be upheld.33 But
the court limited the use of Texas law to determining the software user agree-
ment's validity and the limitation of liability it contained.34 The court ruled
that for all other matters, Hawaii law must govern since, the Ninth Circuit
had required courts to apply Hawaii law to claims that arose under Hawaii
statutory and common law. 35
D. District Court's Holding and Rationale
The court quickly dismissed three of the claims-misrepresentation/de-
ceit, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress-because of the lack of specificity in Smallwood's
pleadings.36 The court indicated that the plaintiff failed to provide the "who,
what, when, and how" that the Ninth Circuit has determined is necessary for
intentional-misrepresentation and unfair-trade-practices claims.37 A fourth
claim, punitive damages, was summarily dismissed because punitive dam-
ages cannot form an independent claim.38 The court analyzed the defamation
claim and found that Smallwood had established all four elements for the
claim in his pleading. But since the defamation claim was based on negli-
gence, Smallwood's damages were limited to only those specified in the
software's User Agreement.39 The court also found that Smallwood satisfied
the elements for both negligence and gross negligence, and the court allowed
those claims to proceed.40 Finally, the court ruled that, while Smallwood met
the elements for the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, he
failed to establish that the act committed by NCsoft was outrageous-an ele-
ment of intentional infliction of emotional distress.41 In Hawaii, for conduct
to meet the "outrageous" requirement, the defendant's conduct must "[ex-
31. Id. at 1223.
32. Id. at 1225-26.
33. Id. at 1225.
34. Smallwood, 730 F. Supp. 2d at1226.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1230, 1232-33, 1235.
37. Id. at 1220 (citing Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th
Cir. 2003)).
38. Id. at 1236.
39. Smallwood, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 1234.
40. Id. at 1235.
41. Id.
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ceed] all bounds usually tolerated by decent society and [be] of a nature
especially calculated to cause mental distress of a very serious kind."42
Here, the court felt that Smallwood did not submit a pleading that an average
member of the community would find "outrageous."43 While the court dis-
missed the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, the claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress survived because the court had al-
ready found that Smallwood properly pleaded negligence.44
E. Court's Rationale
Reviewing the remaining viable claims, the court primarily focused on
NCsoft's alleged negligence as the catalyst for the entire suit. 4 5 The court
began its analysis of the negligence claim by reviewing the elements of a
negligence claim under Hawaii law.46 The court specified that, under Hawaii
law, liability for negligence arises when an actor who has a duty fails to
comply with the required standard of care, and damage occurs to an individ-
ual because of that breach of duty.47 The court then went on to say that, in
order for the claim to succeed for gross negligence, Smallwood must prove
NCsoft exhibited a "conscious indifference" to the possible consequences. 48
While NCsoft argued that the negligence and gross negligence claims were
linked to Smallwood's fraud charge, the court disagreed and found that
Smallwood had provided adequate specificity in his pleadings to state a claim
for negligence.49 In making this determination regarding the pleading's spec-
ificity, the court looked to Smallwood's claims that NCsoft was negligent-
or even grossly negligent-in not only the game's design, manufacture, and
promotion, but also in the company's failure to warn of its addictive nature. 50
The court then pointed to Smallwood's physical injuries-including his in-
ability to function independently, his three-week hospitalization, and his
ongoing therapy-and attributed these injuries to his inability to continue
playing Lineage H.51
The court also followed the rationale that-in order for a plaintiff to
recover for a negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress-claim under Hawaii
42. Hac v. Univ. of Haw., 73 P.3d 46, 60 (Haw. 2003).
43. Smallwood, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 1235 (citing Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198
P.3d 666, 688 (Haw. 2008)).
44. Id. at 1236.
45. Id. at 1234.
46. Id.




51. Id. at 1236.
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law, he must prove that a reasonable person "would be unable to adequately
cope with the mental stress" of the circumstances.52 The court further speci-
fied that if Smallwood were solely able to prove negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress through negligence, then he would be allowed damages-
except as limited by the User Agreement. 53 But if he were able to prove
negligent infliction of emotional distress through gross negligence, then
Smallwood's damages would not have been limited. 54 By accepting
Smallwood's pleadings as adequate and allowing the claims to go to trial, the
court has opened the door to tort law recognizing video game addiction as an
illness that can result in an actionable claim.
F. Critique of Court's Approach
By allowing Smallwood's claims to survive the motion to dismiss, the
court has given credence to the theory that video games can be addicting and,
therefore, manufacturers have a duty to either warn gainers about the possi-
bility of addiction, or face the threat of lawsuits. Hawaii law requires a prod-
uct manufacturer to give appropriate warning of any known product
dangers-those that an end user would not ordinarily discover.55 But it is
imperative that the court first determine whether a danger of addiction even
exists. While many studies indicate that video game addiction may exist,56
numerous other studies question or downplay this possibility.57 In 2007, the
American Medical Association delayed a decision to add "Internet/video
game addiction" as a formal diagnostic disorder to the Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual of Mental Disorders, primarily because of heated opposition
from numerous physician members-including addiction experts-who op-
posed the change.58 But many studies have shown that video game addiction,
in particular addiction to MMORPGs, can have devastating effects on an
52. Smallwood, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 1235.
53. Id. at 1236.
54. Id.
55. Tabieros v. Clark Equip. Co., 944 P.2d 1279, 1313 (Haw. 1997).
56. See Marny R. Hauge & Douglas A. Gentile, presented at Society for Research
in Child Development Conference: Video Game Addiction Among Adolescents:
Associations with Academic Performance and Aggression, April 2003 (con-
cluding that video game addiction among adolescents results in increased ag-
gression and difficulty in school), available at http://drdouglas.org/drdpdfs/
SRCD%20Video%2OGame%20Addiction.pdf.
57. Julie Steenhuysen, Addiction Experts Say Video Games Not an Addiction,
REUTERS, June 25, 2007, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN2425
415820070624.
58. Katherine Noyes, Docs Retreat from 'Video Game Addiction' Diagnosis,
TECHNEwSWORLD, Jun. 25, 2007, available at http://www.technewsworld.
com/story/58014.html.
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individual's social development and mental health.59 For purposes of analyz-
ing this issue, it is helpful to consider an analogous controversy-the effects
of violent video games on adolescents.
By far the greatest controversy over video games has revolved around
the proliferation of violent video games and the possible effects they have on
minors.60 This controversy dates back to the late 1970s,61 but it reached a
feverish pitch following the mass shooting spree at Columbine High School
in 1999.62 The teenage perpetrators were avid players of Doom and Duke
Nukem, two of the most violent games available at that time.63 In response to
the shooting, Congress scrambled to find a reason for the killers' behavior in
an external source such as video games and other media.64 Yet the Congres-
sional inquiry's impact was minimal, as there was little evidence presented
that any "safeguards" were needed beyond the video game rating system that
already existed.65
Similar to studies questioning the addictive capabilities of video games,
there have been numerous studies that focus on violent video games' ability
to increase aggressive tendencies in adolescents.66 While some studies have
shown a possible connection, others have found no causal relationship evi-
dence.67 Many researchers point to the likelihood of a correlation between
violence and video games, as opposed to a causal relationship.68 Thus, prov-
59. Dr. Mohamed K. Khan, Emotional and Behavioral Effects, Including Addictive
Potential, of Video Games 4 (Report of the Council on Science and Public
Health, CSAPH Report 12-A-07, 2007), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama I /pub/upload/mm/467/csaph I 2a07.doc.
60. See generally Patrick Byrd, It's All Fun and Games Until Someone Gets Hurt:
The Effectiveness of Proposed Video-Game Legislation on Reducing Violence
in Children, 44 Hous. L. REV. 401 (2007) (discussing opposing viewpoints
regarding video gaming and aggression); Scott Whittier, School Shootings: Are
Video Game Manufacturers Doomed to Tort Liability?, 17 ENTM'T AND
SPORTs LAWYER I1 (2000) (reviewing studies conducted immediately follow-
ing the Columbine school shooting).
61. Byrd, supra note 60, at 405.
62. See Whittier, supra note 60, at 1I.
63. Id.
64. Gregory Kenyota, Note, Thinking of the Children: The Failure of Violent Video
Game Laws, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 785, 791 (2008).
65. Id.
66. See generally Byrd, supra note 60, at 410-18 (reviewing numerous studies that
present arguments both supporting and refuting theory of video game play
leading to aggression).
67. Kenyota, supra note 64, at 802; Byrd, supra note 60, at 412.
68. Byrd, supra note 60, at 413-14.
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ing causation in these cases may be difficult for plaintiffs.69 Consequently,
courts have also been reluctant to assign liability to companies for actions
taken by consumers.7 0 In an early example of a plaintiff blaming entertain-
ment media for the consumer's actions, the minor plaintiff in Zamora v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System alleged that he became addicted to television,
and claimed that the images he saw desensitized him to violence, leading him
to shoot and kill his 83-year-old neighbor.71 The federal court in Florida
dismissed the claim, stating that the public should have broad access to pro-
gramming, and that access should not be restricted because some members of
the public may be particularly sensitive.72
Similarly, in 1990 the Sixth Circuit upheld the decision by a federal
district court in Kentucky by granting summary judgment for the defendant
game manufacturer in a wrongful death suit involving an avid gamer who
committed suicide.73 Similar to the Smallwood case, the mother of a de-
ceased man alleged that the defendant manufacturer was negligent because it
failed to warn about the addictive nature of the game Dungeons and Drag-
ons.74 The plaintiff alleged that her son was so absorbed by the game that he
lost touch with reality.75 But the district court did not find the mother's alle-
gations persuasive and dismissed the case partially on First Amendment
grounds, stating that assessing liability on those who created content would
be tantamount to "allow[ing] the freaks and misfits of society ... (to) declare
what the rest of the country can and cannot read, watch, and hear."76
Courts have routinely relied on this First Amendment protection argu-
ment to throw out claims against video game manufacturers. For instance, in
Connecticut, a plaintiff-whose son was stabbed to death by one of his
friends-sued a video game manufacturer for negligent and intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, claiming that the boy who killed her son was
addicted to-and obsessed with-the game Mortal Combat.77 The court dis-
69. Whittier, supra note 60, at 14.
70. See generally William Li, Unbaking the Adolescent Cake: The Constitutional
Implications of Imposing Tort Liability on Publishers of Violent Video Games,
45 ARiz. L. REV. 467 (2003) (discussing cases in several different media genres
in which courts have found no liability for manufacturer or producer of en-
tertainment-related material).
71. Zamora v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199, 200 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
72. Id. at 205.
73. Watters v. TSR Inc., 904 F.2d 378, 384 (6th Cir. 1990).
74. Id. at 379-80.
75. Id. at 380.
76. Watters v. TSR, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 819, 822 (W.D. Ky. 1989).
77. Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 170 (D. Conn. 2002).
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missed the complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that video games are
a form of expression protected by the First Amendment.78
Yet some courts have been more open to the theory that video games
can be harmful to individuals. For example, a federal district court in Wis-
consin recently found that the state was well within its rights when it with-
held access to video games from the plaintiff-a sexually violent person who
was involuntarily committed to a state facility for treatment.79 In reviewing
the plaintiff's complaint, the court noted that video games can lead to self-
isolation and lack of community involvement-both of which are detrimental
to the treatment being offered at the facility.80 The court concluded that,
while video games are protected under the First Amendment, in this situation
there was a legitimate state interest in banning them in order to better treat
mentally ill patients.81 This case is obviously distinguishable from
Smallwood's claims, as the court's reasoning applied under a very narrow
scope.82
Even if a court were to find that there was a danger of addiction with
video games, it would then have to find that the person would not have been
able to ordinarily discover this danger.83 In this case, it is extremely unlikely
that the plaintiff would have been unaware of potential risks of overuse of
video games. Since the 1999 shooting at Columbine, the media has inun-
dated the public with stories of the dangers of video games and other me-
dia.84 As an avid gamer, it is extremely unlikely that Smallwood would have
been totally unaware of this story and the possible ramifications it could have
on his ability to play whatever games he wished.
But even if Smallwood legitimately did not know, the court must find
that the danger was such that a reasonable person would not ordinarily dis-
cover it.85 This would be even more difficult for the plaintiff to prove, as he
would be required to show that the average person would not have discov-
ered the possible harmful effects of video games. With the proliferation of
stories for over a decade in the mainstream media about the dangers of video
games, it is highly unlikely that any individual would be unaware of the
78. Id. at 169.
79. Hedgespeth v. Bartow, No. 09-cd-246-slc, 2010 WL 2990897, at *1 (W.D.
Wisc. July 27, 2010).
80. Id. at *5.
81. Id. at *9.
82. Id.
83. Tabieros v. Clark Equip. Co., 944 P.2d 1279, 1313 (Haw. 1997).
84. See generally Bonnie B. Phillips, Virtual Violence or Virtual Apprenticeship:
Justification for the Recognition of a Violent Video Game Exception to the
Scope of the First Amendment Rights of Minors, 36 IND. L. REV 1385 (2003).
85. Tabieros, 944 P.2d at 1313.
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possible negative effects associated with extensive game play exist.86 For
example, when a student at Virginia Tech went on a shooting rampage in
2007, video games were quickly blamed for the shooter's aggression, even
though subsequent investigations revealed absolutely no evidence that he
played video games of any kind.87 Video games and their possible detrimen-
tal effects have been in the news repeatedly for other issues as well, includ-
ing gamer suicides,88 their alleged addictive properties, 89 and gamer-on-
gamer violence. 90 Further, a simple Google search for "video game addic-
tion" yields over I million results,91 while searches for "video game danger"
and "video game violence" yield approximately 60 million 92 and 40 million93
results, respectively. While a court might believe the argument that video
games can be addicting, it would be much more difficult for the court to find
that a reasonable person would not be aware of these possible dangers. Thus,
the court should not allow the claim to survive a motion to dismiss.
II. CONCLUSION
By its ruling, this court has allowed Smallwood to take his case to a jury
to determine if a reasonable person would not have known about the possible
danger of video game addiction.9o But this subject remains open to serious
debate, and allowing this plaintiff the opportunity to recover can open up the
courts to additional lawsuits, which include complaints that cannot be defini-
tively settled. The court here seems to be shifting the onus of responsibility
for one's own well-being from the plaintiff to the software designer. While
most courts across the country have rapidly dismissed this type of claim, the
Hawaii court's opinion seems very case-specific, and the court seems to pay
86. See generally Kenyota, supra note 64, at 787-96.
87. Kenyota, supra note 64, at 812-13.
88. David Kohn, Addicted: Suicide Over Everquest?, CBS NEWS (Oct. 18, 2002),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/10/17/48hours/main5 25965.
shtml.
89. Video Game Addiction: Is It Real?, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (Apr. 2, 2007), http:/
www.harrisinteractive.com/news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewslD= 1196.
90. Cao Li, Death Sentence for Online Gamer, CHINA DAILY, June 8, 2005, http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/08/content_449494.htm; Henrick
Karoliszyn et al., Anthony Maldonado, 9, Stabbed to Death Over Video Game
While Visiting Family in Harlem, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, Jan. 3, 2010, avail-
able at http://www.nydailynews.com/ny-local/2010/01/02/2010-01-02_new-
jersey-boy-9-stabbed to-death in-hallway of harlem.housing-project
whilevis.html.
91. GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (last visited Aug. 3, 2011).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Smallwood, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 1236.
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special attention to the fact that Smallwood had physical injuries in addition
to his mental injuries. Further, allowing recovery under these circumstances
could lead to future cases in which the only damages that exist are purely
emotional-without corresponding physical damages. The court here has de-
viated from the standards set by other courts, perhaps in response to public
opinion on violent media and heightened addiction awareness. Whatever the
reason, the court has opened a Pandora's box of future litigation.

